Washington Post: After more than $1.6 billlion in US aid, Iraq’s army still struggling

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Critics say the United States and its allies risk repeating the mistakes of the past.

“I’ve asked commanders what is our political strategy in Iraq, and they don’t seem to know,” said Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.), who served in Iraq as a Marine officer in 2004 and 2005, and later returned when President George W. Bush sent in 20,000 additional troops for what was known as the “surge.”

“If you listen to the plans, they are remarkably similar to those we had back in 2007 for the surge. And so it begs the question, since we just did this eight years ago, how is this time going to be different? And the silence is shocking.”

For Moulton, the failings of U.S. policy can be tracked to the decision by L. Paul Bremer, Iraq’s American ruler in 2003, to dismantle the Iraqi army. “It was a terrible idea,” he said.

Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi agreed that the problems today stem from shortcomings in earlier efforts to build up security forces.

“We are facing the task of rebuilding and reorganizing the army because the way it was built previously was very flawed,” he said.

Obeidi said that partner countries are now providing assistance more effectively and that military support from the United States and allied nations, especially their air power, had made a big difference for the ground effort against the Islamic State, weakening the group and depriving it of funding and supplies.

But Iraq will require military assistance long after the Islamic State is defeated, he said.

When the United States rebuilt the Iraqi army after 2003, it was training a force to deal with the insurgency raging across the country, said Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, commander of the coalition’s ground force component.

“This is not a counterinsurgency,” he said. “We are fighting an enemy that’s defending, that occupies terrain.”

Now, units that have good leadership are performing well, he said.

But leaders such as Araji remain hard to find.

The Americans who worked with Araji, including Moulton, described his death as a blow to the country. “We worked closely with many Iraqis, but none more closely than Ihab,” Moulton said.

In a military short of leaders, Iraq had lost another.

At Araji’s home in Diwaniyah, his colleague Hamza hung his head.

“If I could go back in time, I’d sacrifice my life and my whole family’s for Ihab,” he said. “He was a commander with all the meaning of the word.”

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