The Iran Nuclear Deal: The Best Option on the Table
August 1st, 2015
To read my full statement of support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, please click here.
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Response to the Common Criticisms
“No deal is better than a bad deal” is a much-heralded statement, and I agree with it myself–but it only makes sense in the context of our real-world alternatives. We shouldn’t agree to a “bad deal” that precludes other, more appealing options. At the same time, no deal with an adversary is a perfect deal, so it’s critical to evaluate the criticisms and judge how this agreement stacks up against the prospects of either going to war or trying to negotiate a better deal in the future.
Claim: The proposed deal does not ensure “anytime, anywhere” short-notice inspections.
Transparency and enforceability are the two most important components of this deal. Iran cannot be trusted, so we must verify and enforce their compliance. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have the right to a constant physical and technical presence in Iran’s three known nuclear sites and will be able to regularly monitor the country’s uranium mines and centrifuge production facilities. With an impressive suite of in-person inspections and electronic surveillance and alarms, the deal facilitates monitoring Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain. As a condition of sanctions relief, IAEA inspectors will have access to any location they have reason to suspect relates to nuclear activities within 24 hours’ notice. If Iran were to deny an IAEA request for access to a suspicious, undeclared location, an access dispute resolution mechanism will be triggered that, if unresolved, could lead to the immediate imposition of sanctions by the P5+1.
The potential 24-day waiting period was an issue of grave concern to me when the agreement was announced, but subsequent classified and unclassified briefings have allayed my concerns. Any facilities that Iran uses to develop nuclear weapons would be very difficult to conceal and cannot be quickly dismantled or removed of radioactive remnants. The inspections regime is not perfect (a shorter period than 24 days would of course be better, for example), but I believe it is strong enough to ensure compliance. Importantly, it will gives far more access and transparency to Iran’s activities than we would have if we rejected the deal.
Claim: The deal does not condition sanctions relief on Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA regarding the possible military dimensions of Iran’s program.
Iran will not receive sanctions relief until the IAEA completes its investigation regarding the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has agreed to provide the IAEA with information and access to its nuclear facilities as a condition of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran must also dismantle and reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98% and keep its enriched uranium well below the level needed to create a nuclear weapon.
Currently, Iran has enough enriched uranium and centrifuges in place to have a nuclear weapon within 2 to 3 months. Under the deal, their breakout time is extended to a year. That gives the international community far more time to respond if Iran reneges on any part of the deal. Consider that, if we rejected the deal, Iran would be able to build a bomb within months just as our allies relieve sanctions and while we try to re-negotiate a new sanctions regime.
Some have argued that the deal does not require Iran to “come clean” about the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program. But the same critics rightly assert that we cannot trust Iran in the first place. Demanding that a regime tell us the truth when we won’t believe it anyway would be a useless provision.
Claim: The proposed deal lifts sanctions as soon as the deal commences, rather than gradually as Iran demonstrates sustained adherence to the deal:
Many have voiced their concerns about the timeframe of lifting sanctions on Iran as a condition of this agreement. Under the JCPOA, sanctions relief will happen in phases and relief will be based on Iran’s adherence to the conditions of the deal. Iran must satisfy a set of challenging and expensive changes to its nuclear facilities, including the removal of more than two-thirds of its centrifuges and modifying its Arak facility for peaceful research by filling the reactor core with concrete among other requirements. Continued sanctions relief and the eventual termination of sanctions are inextricably tied to Iran’s compliance over time.
The deal also includes a “mandatory review” provision, which requires that any decision to reimpose sanctions be approved by a majority vote without the ability for any individual member to veto. This important provision will prevent China or Russia from vetoing a decision by us and our European allies to snap back sanctions.
Some have also raised concerns that the deal does not include restrictions–or limit sanctions relief–on Iran’s other nefarious actions, such as the regime’s support for international terrorism, work on ballistic missiles, or continued holding of American hostages. This comes back to negotiating strategy: getting any non-nuclear concessions would have required concessions on our nuclear demands–that’s how a negotiation works–and given the existential threat an Iranian nuclear weapon poses to the world, this would have been a mistake.
Claim: The proposed deal lifts key restrictions in as few as eight years and “legitimizes Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon”:
Under this agreement, all of Iran’s pathways to enrichment are blocked through unparalleled transparency and monitoring measures. For 10 years, Iran will not be able to produce enriched uranium with any of its advanced centrifuges while other restrictions last 15, 20, and 25 years. The agreement also reaffirms that it is illegal for Iran to ever develop a nuclear weapon. Any future attempts by the Iranians to go down the pathway toward a bomb will trigger the “snap back” of sanctions and other significant actions by the international community.
Since Iran has demonstrated its untrustworthiness, we must carefully consider how we will respond if Iran cheats and tries to develop a nuclear weapon in spite of the agreement. Reimposing sanctions will be far easier–automatic, in fact–with the deal than without it. The current sanctions regime required years to negotiate and establish, and we will have far less credibility with the international community to impose sanctions in the future if we reject this diplomatic option today.
We will also have far less credibility, not just internationally but domestically as well, to go to war if we reject this diplomatic option. With the Iraq War still fresh in Americans’ minds, I believe getting the votes to go to war with Iran in the U.S. Congress would be challenging if we don’t pursue the peaceful pathway first. Furthermore, bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities would be far easier with the unprecedented transparency and intelligence provided by the deal.
Claim: The proposed deal does not require the dismantlement of centrifuges or any Iranian nuclear facilities:
Through the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to physically remove an estimated 13,000 centrifuges from their current locations in Iran’s nuclear facilities – roughly two-thirds of its total installed centrifuges. This process will be monitored closely by the IAEA. Fifteen years ago, dismantling all of their nuclear infrastructure was an appealing option, but you can’t sanction or bomb away knowledge, so at this point, it’s far more important that we have the most intrusive inspections regime possible. Further limiting their nuclear equipment or material stockpiles at the expense of a less rigorous inspections regime would have been a huge negotiating mistake since they now know how to create more.
Claim: All of our allies are opposed to the deal, including both sides of the Israeli political spectrum and our allies in the Persian Gulf.
Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East, and supporting Israel has never before been seen as a partisan issue in the United States. Israel requires our continued support, and we must acknowledge the state’s vocal concerns with this deal. Ultimately, however, we must act in our national interest even if our allies object. The fact is that just three countries out of the more than 190 countries in the world have expressed opposition to this deal. Further, all of these countries are in the Middle East where, frankly, it makes political sense for our allies to register their concerns because it increases their leverage for demanding further U.S. military and economic support if we accept the deal over their objections.
Conclusion:
This deal is imperfect, as any deal with an adversary always is. Whether or not the Administration could have negotiated better terms is basically irrelevant at this point. We must either support or reject the deal on the table in light of the other options before us. As I have examined the criticisms of the deal in great detail, asked tough questions of the Administration and of military and civilian experts whose opinions I deeply respect, I have grown increasingly confident that accepting the JCPOA is the best way forward.
Doing so does not ensure success. We must hold Iran to account, continually verifying their compliance, and only increase our pressure on the regime for all their other nefarious actions that are a detriment to world peace and our allies’ and our own national security. We must also work to restore confidence in our allies in the Middle East and across the globe.
One final comment: Several people have said to me that they don’t envy my position having to make such a difficult decision in a world of imperfect options. But this is what I was elected to do, and it is a responsibility I take as seriously as I took the safety and success of my Marines in combat. With that experience always in my mind, it is a burden and responsibility I am proud to accept.
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To read my full statement of support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, please click here.
